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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT KELLOGG WAS A BENEFICIARY OF ANY TITLE 
INSURANCE POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE INSURANCE POLICY ~/AS NOT PURCHASED 
SY HAUETER. 
POINT II 
ThE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT PARAGRAPH 19 OF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT MODIFIED THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 18. 
POINT III 
;HE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT KELLOGG HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE THAYNE 
JUDGMENT AND THAT HE PURCHASED THE SELLER'S INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT 
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. 
POINT IV 
ThE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
POINT V 
7.iE TITLE INSURJ'.\NCE COMPANY BY PAYING THE ENTIRE CLAIM HAS SUBROGATED 
~ANY CLAIM APPELLANT HAD AGAINST ANY THIRD PARTIES. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
c.~RL HAUETER, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs . Supreme Court No. 15497 
11ARVIN E. PEGUIU .. AN, WILMA J. 
?EGUILLAN, his wifs; FRANCIS 
~. KELLOGG, et al., 
Defendants-Respo~dent 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action involves a Complaint and Counterclaim arising 
out of a Uniform Real Estate Contract. The Complaint is denominated 
a quiet-title action and also contained causes of action for fraud. 
The Counterclaim was one for termination and forfeiture of the Uni-
form Real Estate action by the Respondent for failure of the Appel-
lant to make payments. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Judge Bryant H. Croft found no cause of action as to the 
/laintiff-Appellants case. The Court ruled that Appellant had not 
J.aoe payments to Respondent since May, 1974 and was therefore in 
:efault. However, the Court determined that it 1vould be inequitable 
:~forfeit the Appellant's interest in the Uniform Real Estate Con-
:net. -:-he Court, therefore, entered judgment in favor of Respondent 
.,, the sum cf Sl ,95•J .00 For oack pa;ments, plus 5750.00 as reasonable 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Kellogg seeks to have affirmed the District 
Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 24, 1972, Marvin E. Peguillan and Wilma 
J. Peguillan, his wife, sold their real property at 1463 South 10th 
East, Salt Lake City, Utah (which property is the subject of this 
action) to John C. Larsen, pursuant to a Uniform Real Estate Contrac 
(Exhibit I-P). On June 20, 1972, John C. Larsen assigned the Buyer 
interest in said property to the Appellant. On July 11, 1972, Marv 
E. Peguillan and Wilma J. Peguillan conveyed the Seller's interest 
in said real estate c0ntract to Francis H. Kellogg, the Respcndent 
herein and Josepr1ir:e Kellogg, his \'life, who is now deceased. Attn: 
time of the sale of the real property from Peguillan to Larsen, 
Peguillan provided Larsen with a policy of title insurance in which 
Pioneer National Title Insurance Company was the insurer and 1tJesterr 
States Title Company '!las Pioneer's authorized agent (Tr. 32, Exhibi: 
8-0). When .A.ppellant purchased the property from John C. Larsen, 
Larsen provided a title policy in 111hic~ Pioneer National Title In-
surance Company was the insurer and Western States Title Company 
111as the authorized agent (Exhibit 19-0). Mr. Ray J .. 'Ceys, who 
performed the closing for the Larsen-Haueter transaction, testifiec 
that Mr. Larsen paid for the title insurance policy (Tr.97). The 
Buyers and Sellers statement prep::ired at the closing \~xn~cits 1.\-: 
and 15-0) further indicated that Mr. Larsen paid for said pJlicy. 
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At the time of the sale of the property from Peguillan to 
Larsen, there was a judgment against Peguillan in favor of rlr. Cleon 
~nayne. Although Appellant claims that there were other judgments 
on the property, all of the other judgments claimed were entered 
against Peguillan ah.er the property had been sold to Larsen, and 
therefore are not li<.:ns on Appel:ant's interest. The Court indicated 
that the question of the other judgments was handled at pre-trial, 
that the other parties were not served and that pursuant to stipulation, 
and the law, any claim as to other judgment were dismissed (Tr.109). 
In fact, judgments entered against a person after he has sold his 
interest in the property do not cloud the title to that property. 
The Appellant has paid $3,114.61 to clear the Thayne 
judgment. Thereafter, Appellant brought suit against the title in-
surance company which had failed to disclose the judgment on either 
title policy, Exhibit 8-D or Exhibit 19-0 for recovery of the sum 
of$3,114.61 and other alleged damages. At trial, a settlement •11as 
reached in •11hich the Appellant received $6,000.00 from the title 
'nsurance company, consicterably more than the amount expended by 
icpeilant. (Tr. 83 and Tr. 108-109). 
The essence of the Appellant's claim is that because of 
+ne Cleon Thayne judgment, he is entitled to credit against the 
1eol Estate Contract assigned to Respondent Kellogg for the amount 
Jf said judgment ($3,114.61), even though he has received payment 
'rscn the title company in the sum of 56,000.00 for that judgment. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-4-
There is ample testimony that Respondent Kellogg was 
unaware of the Cleon Thayne judgment at the time he purchased the 
Seller's interest in the property (Tr. 30-31 and Tr. 55). There 
is further testimony that Respondent Kellogg paid $2,200.00 in 
consideration for having the Seller's interest in the Real Estate 
Contract assigned to him (Tr. 55) and (Exhibit 10-D). Despite 
Appellant's constant reference, both in the trial and in his brief, 
to Kellogg as a "wrong-doer" (see for example Page 14 of Appellant'' 
Brief), the Court found the facts to be exactly the opposite \Tr.i9 
The lower court ruled that the Appellant did not have a 
cause of action against Respondent Kellogg as a result of the Cleon 
Thayne judgment, and that pursuant to the contractural relationshi; 
between the parties, the title insurance company !iad responsibiiity 
for making payment to Appellant, which lt did. 
It is clear from the Appellant's testimony, that this 
action was not brought on behalf of the title insurance company (Tr 
Appellant alleges in his Brief (Page 10) that Haueter pai:, 
$4,250.00. This comes from adding the $1,150.00 paid to the credi: 
A p p e 1 1 an t s e e ks o f S 3 , 1 1 4 . 6 l . No e v i den c e v1 a s i n trod u c e d s how i n 9 
payments of $4,250.00. 
The Appellant has consistently stated in his 3rief, tna'. 
Peguillan knew that the judgment existed and that he defrauded the 
Appellant (see Brief Pages 4, 5 and 9). ~lthough this issue is not 
mai:.erial to the use ~efore the Co'Jlt, the record disc11Jses t[,,it 
t h e o n l y t e s t i m o n y o n t h e j s s u e i s t h a t ? e g 1J i 1 l a n 'ti a s r, o : 3 ·.v 3 r e ; ; 
. . . , l j I , ~ 31 ' r ,.. •no r~C' the J u d gm en~ at t ri e ~ i ~' e t '1 at n e so · t .J _a rs en \ ' r . . · . - •J · ·, , ' 
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'.he Appellant's statement on Page 9 that "Peguillan actually defrauded 
rarl Haueter when he sold the property to him" is untrue. Peguillan 
did not sell the property to Haueter and there is no evidence from 
iaueter, or anyone else, that Peguillan made any representations to 
<aueter, or even knew Haueter prior to the sale from Larsen to Haueter. 
ARGUMENT - POINT 
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT KELLOGG 'IJAS A BENEFICIARY OF ANY TITLE 
l~SURIHICE POLICY. FURTHERMORE, THE HIS URAN CE POLICY WAS NOT PURCHASED 
SY HAUETE R. 
Appel ]ant's first argument is without merit. The Court did 
not rule that Kellogg 1~as the beneficiary of the title insurance 
iolicy. Neither the record nor the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
supports Appellant's contention. Furthermore, the Court and the 
evidence show conclusively that Haueter did not purchase any title 
insurance policy germane to this case. One title insurance policy 
i:,1.Exhibit 8-0) was purchased by Peguillan. The other policy (Exhibit 
19-D), was pur::hased by Larsen. Appellant's brief argues a con-
;piracy theory which Appellant did not i)rove in trial. The Court 
:1early ruled at the end of the Plaintiff's evidence that Appellant 
'aiied to convince the Court that Kellogg knew of the Thayne judgment 
:r was engaged in an; conspiracy or collaboration with Peguillan to 
::fraud anybody (7r. 95). Appellant's Point l is obviously intended 
:1 be a straw-man •11nici1 Appell ant stan·~S '.J;J and then knocks down. 
:t does not reflect i:~e rul in] of the C0ur·t. In 1 i ne with trie fore-
'.•1ng, it should tie noi:ed ~hat on Page 12 of Appellant's Brief, 
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Appellant states that nothing in Paragraph 19 of the UGiform Real 
Estate Contract permits a "wrong-doer" the right to "collect twice 
under the contract". Respondent again wishes to point out that 
Kellogg 1~as not a wrong-doer and that al 1 that Kellogg wants is the 
payments due to him under the contract. Kellogg has not received 
payment for the sums lawfully due to him once, much less twice. 
It is obvious that Appellant is seeking a windfall. Appellant 
received $6,000.00 as compensation for his paying a judgment of 
$3,114.61 and is now seeking credit against the contract for an 
additional $3,114.61. 
ARGUMENT - POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT RULE THAT PARAGRAPH 19 CF THE UNIFORM REAL ESTA7c 
CONTRACT MODIFIED THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 18. 
Appellant has again set up a straw-man. The Court ruled 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract must be interpreted as a wnole. 
That since the expenditure by Appellant on the Thayne judgment was' 
totally reimbursed, Appellant could not escape the payments due unc: 
the contract. In the case before the Court, Peguillan provided 
a title pol icy to Larsen which gave full coverage in the event 
that the title ·11as not clear. Larsen provided Haueter •11ith a re-
issue on that policy. In ~act, in part of his arguments to tne 
Court, Mr. Minor agreed with the basic principle that the Court 
was getting at: 
"The Court: Suppose to simply 1 llusi:rate, 3.S 
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see the probable situation here, suppose the title insurance 
company had said right at the outset, 'We sure goofed. We 
missed that judgment. We will pay it off, No Sheriff's Sale'. 
Mr. Miner: They didn't do that. They fought us 
right down to the wire with every defense they could find. 
The Court: Suppose they had done that? 
i'1r. Miner: Then, we wouldn't be here today." 
Paragraph 18 is not intended to give the Buyer under a 
~niform Real Estate Contract a bonanza. It is intended to protect 
1 buyer from having to pay more than the contracted-for purchase 
1rice. However, if a Buyer is compensated for sums advanced, surely 
then he cannot also withhold or suspend payments. 
The Seller provided a title insurance policy in accordance 
Hith the Uniform Real Estate Contract to guarantee the buyer clear 
title. Surely, a Seller's obligation under the Uniform Real Estate 
:ontract cannot be increased by an assignment of the contract by 
tne buyer. 
The real estate transactions which resulted in this lawsuit 
requires the seller of the property to provide the buyer .vith a clear 
'.itle. Both the earnest money agreement (11-P) and the contract 
!-P) establish tnat a seller's obligation is met by providing title 
"
1 surance. If there is an undisclosed defect in the title, the 
)'JJ9r has several remedies. In thisc:i.se the Appellant had decided 
:o PJrsue the remedies under tfie ti:le policy he received as part 
the transaction. The Appellant made his election, proceeded with 
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it and l'.'as quite successful. The buyer is entitled to clear title. 
The buyer is not entitled to pursue more than one remed;. The 
Uniform Real Estate Contract does not envision that a buyer recover 
more than once for damages resulting from a title encumbrance. The 
Appellant wishes the Court to provide him t1ith a windfall. He has 
received $6,000.00 in compensation for paying $3,114.61 on a judg8e· 
He now wishes to escape payment under the contract for sums which 
are in fact owed. The result would be highly inequitable, Appellan: 
would benefit in the sum of $9,114.61 for having paid off a $3,114. 
judgment. Respondent Kellogg would not receive the funds due to h:· 
under the contract. Such an interpretation of the transactions bef. 
the Court is unreasonable. 
ARGUMENT - POi~T III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT KELLOGG HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE THAn 
JUDGMENT AND THAT HE PURCHASED THE SELLER'S INTEREST IN THE CONnAC' 
FOR GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. 
The Appel l ant ' s i n n u end o to the contrary , the Court c 1 ear 
ruled that Kellogg had no knowledge of the Thayne judgment and 11as 
not a "wrong-doer". (Tr.79) This finding is amply supported by th: 
record (Tr. 30, 31 and 55). The Appellant in effect, is requestin: 
that the Supreme Court make a factual finding contrar; to that of 
the lower court. The Supreme Sourt has stated on numerous insta!I> 
that it will view evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favon.ble t'.) sustaining the aecision. See for e.<ample. 
Oberh~~..L.. vs. C:H1e, No. 14520 File:J C:ecember 21, 1977 and ~2:.'. 
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11 . Bowen, 543 P. 2d 1349 (1975). The consideration paid by 
?espondent Kellogg was not disputed. No evidence was introduced 
to controvert his testimony that he did not know of the Thayne 
;udgment. The lower court's finding in this regard should be up-
~e 1 d . 
ARGUMENT - POINT IV 
Tiff COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The collateral source rule is one which is applicable to 
ton cases. 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages 286, 5206 in explaining the 
collateral source rule, states that it is a rule applicable to tort 
cases. See al so footnote 12, 22 Am Ju r. 2nd Damages 284, §204. 
Not only does the collateral source rule apply only to 
ton cases, but almost always only to health, accident and life 
J', insurance proceeds. See 77 Harvard L. Rev. 741, 742 (Feb. 1964). 
C' See also "The Collateral Source Rule" 21 Ohio St. L.J. 231, 233: 
"An examination of a long line of cases in many of the 
jurisdictions indicates that the doctrine has been applied in 
the following types of situations: (l) salary received by tne 
1: injured person during his period of disability; (2) pensions, 
1c whether retirement or disability, received as a result of the 
injuries; (3) insurance proceeds-death, hospitalization, medical 
n> care, etc.; (4) hospital and ,11edical care furnished gratuitously." 
The cases cited by Appellant are traditional tort cases 
irising from automobile accidents. The collateral source rule does 
~ 1cp1y ':o such cases, but not to contractual cases as the one before 
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the Court. 
Furthermore, in the collateral source cases, the insured 
paid for the policy or had the right pursuant t_o an employment arrar 
ment of his own. 
In this case, the insurance was provided by the seller tc 
cover title defects. It is not a collateral benefit, but one aris'· 
directly from the transaction in question. 
Th e c o 1 1 a t e r a l s o u r c e r u 1 e , a s a n e x c e p t i o n t o t h e d o c tr i r: 
of mitigating damages and permitting recovery only for actual losse: 
should be strictly construed. 
ARGUMENT - POINT V 
THE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY BY PAYING THE ENTIRE CLAIM HAS SUBROG~.:: 
TO ANY CLAIM APP~LLA~T YAD AGA:NST ANY -~iRD PAqT!~5. 
Paragraph 3 of the title insurance policy (Exhibit 19-D) 
provides, "Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under'.~ 
policy, all rigr1t of subrogation shall vest in the Company Jnaffe::· 
by any act of the Insured, and it shall be subrogateci co iJ.11d oe 
en~itled to all rights and remedies ~hich the Insured wo~id nav~ 
aga1~st any person or property in respect to such ~]aim na~ tnis 
policy not be iss:.ied." 
By receiving payment pursuant co that policy fr:w the;,;· 
rnsurance company, any claim of the Apps~ia.~<c Jgains~ a1;1 ',,~Jr,g< 
passed to tne tit~e ins~ran:e ccmpa~y. 
7 h e r u ; e i s a p t : f s t a t e d i n ad :. m .j -' r . 2 .j • ~ : 3 2 G : ~ . ' · · 
,; T h e i; e n e r a 1 r u 1 e ~ s t h a t u p o n p a y m e n t J f a : J s :; , t :1 e i r s J ,. ·; r · 
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the insurers in the case of co-insurance, is entitled to be sub-
rogated pro-tanto, to any right of action which the insured may have 
against the third person, whose negligence or wrongful act caused 
the loss." 
The Supreme Court of Utah has supported the majority 
~osition. In Potomac Insurance Company vs. Nickson 64 Utah 395, 
23 Pac . .+45 (1934) the Court stated: "The Courts have almost 
, unanimously held that when an insurer has paid an entire loss, it is 
the only real party in interest." 
In State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. vs. Farmers Insurance bchange, 
22 U. 2d 183 (1969), the Supreme Court stated: 
"Subrogation springs from equity concluding that one 
having been reimbursed for a specific loss should not be 
entitled to a second reimbursement therefor." Id at 184. 
The recogGized law is also stated in 13 ALR 3d 229, 248 §6(a): 
"ln most of the cases wherein the question has arisen or 
been commented upon, it has been held or recognized that where 
a property loss caused by the wrongful act of a third person 
~as been fu1iy paid by insurance the insured cannot maintain 
an action in his own name against the tortfeasor to recover 
for the loss, on the theory that the insured has no interest 
in the claim, i1is insurer being subrogated to all his rights 
ther-ein." 
Numerous courts have held that when an insurance company pays 
i 10os in full, thc.t only the insuranc2 company has the right to bring 
' iction against a thira µarty who caused the loss. See United State• 
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vs. Aetna Insurance Company 338 U.S. 366 (1949); Sha~ vs.~ 
Blackey Plumbing 81 Heating Co._ 264 N.C. 456, 142 SE 2d 18\1965); 
Great Amer i can I r. s u r . Co . vs . Watt 2_, 0 k l a . 3 9 3 P . 2 d 2 3 6 ( 1 9 6 4) ; a nc 
Campbell vs. Campbell, 172 Kan. E40, 243 P. 2d 197 (i952). 
Any claim of the Appellant therefore passes tc the t1t:e .I 
insurance company, and Appellant looses any right to use the $3,114.:, 
as an offset against the amount aue to Responde~t. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly determined that Appellant was 
not entitled to claim the sum of $3,114.El as an offset and that 
ll.ppellant was delinquent in payments totalling $1,950.00. 
Jf the trial court s~o~la therefore te affirme1. 
Respect~ully submitted: 
920 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
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